Author : Meradj Morteza Pouraghdam
Release : 2016
Genre :
Kind : eBook
Book Rating : /5 ( reviews)

GET EBOOK

Book Synopsis Three Essays on the Role of Frictions in the Economy by : Meradj Morteza Pouraghdam

Download or read book Three Essays on the Role of Frictions in the Economy written by Meradj Morteza Pouraghdam. This book was released on 2016. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this thesis I have investigated three aspects of market frictions. Chapter 1 is about financial frictions, i.e. frictional forces prevailing in the financial lending markets and how monitoring and legal fines imposed on banks affect financial fragility. Chapter 2 explores the frictional labor market, i.e. frictional forces that prevent the smooth matching process between employees and employers in labor markets. In this chapter I investigate the sources of fluctuations in labor market volatility. Chapter 3 investigates the asymmetrical information in lending markets and how bankruptcy law could potentially affect this asymmetrical information between a borrower and its lenders. In Chapter 1, I have investigated the implications of legal fines and partial monitoring in a macro-finance model. This primary motivation of this work was the unprecedented level of fines banks faced in recent years. The research in this field is very sparse and this work is one of the few to fill in the void. I have tried investigating the implications of fines and partial monitoring in static and dynamic frameworks. There is partial monitoring in the sense that dubious behavior of intermediaries is not always observed with certainty. Moreover intermediaries can pay some litigation fees to mitigate the punishment for their conduct should they get caught. Several insights can be drawn from introducing such concepts in static and dynamic frameworks. Partial monitoring and legal fines make the incentive constraint of intermediaries more relaxed, in the sense that bankers are required to pledge less collateral to raise fund. This decrease in the asset pledgeability pushes the corporate spread down. In a dynamic set-up due to changes in asset qualities caused by such possibilities, recovery in output and credit become sluggish in response to an adverse financial shock. The dynamic implications of the model for the post-crisis period are investigated. This paper calls for further research to broaden our understandings in how legal settlements interact with banks' behaviors. In Chapter 2 (joint with Elisa Guglielminetti) I have investigated the time-varying property of job creation in the United States. Despite extensive documentation of the US labor market dynamics, evidence on its time-varying volatility is very hard to find. In this work I contribute to the literature by structurally investigating the time-varying volatility of the U.S. labor market. I address this issue through a time-varying parameter VAR (TVP-VAR) with stochastic volatility by identifying four structural shocks through imposing robust restrictions based on a New Keynesian DSGE model with frictional labor markets and a large set of shocks. The main findings are as follows. First, at business cycle frequencies, the lion share of the variance of job creation is explained by cost-push and demand shocks, thus challenging the conventional practice of addressing the labor market volatility puzzle à la Shimer under the assumption that technology shocks are the main driver of fluctuations in hiring. Second, technology shocks had a negative impact on job creation until the beginning of the '90s. This result is reminiscent of the "hours puzzle" à la Gali. In Chapter 3 (joint with Garence Staraci) I provide an additional rationale why creditors include covenants in their contracts. The central claim is that covenants are not only included as a means of shifting the governance from debtors to creditors, but also to potentially address the concerns creditors might have about how the bankruptcy law is practiced. To investigate this claim, I take advantage of the fact that covenants are nullified inside bankruptcy. This fact permits us to show that any change to the bankruptcy law affects the spread through changes that it brings to the contractual structure...