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Essays in Over-the-counter Markets

2019
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Release : 2019
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Book Synopsis Essays in Over-the-counter Markets by : Yu An

Download or read book Essays in Over-the-counter Markets written by Yu An. This book was released on 2019. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis consists of three essays, which examine several issues in over-the-counter financial markets. The first essay shows that dealers build socially excessive inventories in order to compete for market share. The distortion in pricing is empirically identified using transaction level data in the U.S. corporate bond market. The second essay shows that the two roles of a dealer, immediacy provision and matchmaking, create a conflict of interest. A direct implication is that bid-ask spread is a misleading measure of immediacy provision. The third essay introduces reducible intermediation chains in order to quantitatively measure search frictions in over-the-counter markets. This allows us to categorize intermediation chains by their primary intermediation incentives. Specifically, the first essay shows that dealers in over-the-counter markets build socially excessive inventories in order to compete for market share and get the associated intermediation rents. Using the TRACE dataset for the U.S. corporate bond market, I find that, excluding the crisis, the incentive to build inventory raises dealers' bid prices for corporate bonds by an average of 5 basis points. During the crisis, this effect was reversed by 23 basis points of implied additional dealer balance-sheet costs. The second essay, co-authored with Zeyu Zheng, shows that the two roles of a dealer, immediacy provision and matchmaking, create a conflict of interest that leads dealers to hold inefficiently high levels of inventory in order to extract additional rents from customers. Because of this, bid-ask spread is a misleading measure of immediacy provision. Our model suggests the use of execution delays as an additional measure of immediacy provision. The third essay, co-authored with Yang Song and Xingtan Zhang, introduces reducible intermediation chains in order to quantitatively measure search frictions in over-the-counter markets. This allows us to categorize intermediation chains by their primary intermediation incentives. Using interdealer trades in the U.S. corporate bond market, we discover new types of intermediation chains that are not formed to mitigate search frictions or to facilitate liquidity provision. Instead, these chains arise when dealers intermediate trades for other dealers in order to unwind positions at a profit.

Essays on Over-the-Counter Financial Markets

2020
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Release : 2020
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Book Synopsis Essays on Over-the-Counter Financial Markets by : Shuo Liu

Download or read book Essays on Over-the-Counter Financial Markets written by Shuo Liu. This book was released on 2020. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three chapters that study dealer's endogenous search effort in over-the-counter (OTC) financial markets and its effect on asset's liquidity risk in U.S. corporate bond markets. In Chapter 1, I study dealer's search intensity using a transaction-level data set on U.S. corporate bonds. The main target of this chapter is to test whether dealer's search intensity is endogenously determined by their idiosyncratic states and how search intensity affects market efficiency. Existing literatures commonly do not consider dealer's continuous adjustment of search intensity in search-and-match models and there is no paper using transaction-level data to estimate the dealer-level state-dependent search intensity. In this paper, I propose a search-and-match model with dealers' endogeneous and state-dependent search intensity and estimate it using the TRACE data for the U.S. corporate bond market. I find that: [1] if we rank all dealers by their private valuations for holding the bond, the dealer of the middle-level private valuation will choose the highest level of search intensity, and she works as the "dealer of dealers" to reallocate bond positions from the low-type dealers to the high-type dealers; [2] the estimated model gives us a quantitative evaluation of the inefficiency due to the decentralized market structure. At the average level across all sub-markets in our sample, the model estimates that dealers' search cost is 0.75% of bond's face value, and there is on average 8.64% of bond positions being misallocated, comparing with a counterfactual frictionless market. In conclusion, the decentralized market structure generates 8.96% welfare loss relative to the frictionless one. In Chapter 2, I study the correlation between corporate bond's misallocation among dealers and liquidity risk. This chapter bridges the literature on search-and-match models and the literature on explaining the non-default component of corporate bond's credit spread variations. In this paper, I propose a measure of bond's misallocation among dealers. This measure is based on a structural search-and-match model, and is defined as the cross-sectional covariance of dealers' idiosyncratic private valuations for holding the bond and their actual inventory positions in the bond. Using the TRACE data for the U.S. corporate bond market, I construct a panel data which contains yearly series of empirical estimates of bond's misallocation and liquidity risk, and verify that: at the bond level, a higher magnitude of misallocation among the dealers is associated with a higher magnitude of liquidity risk. This finding gives a preliminary market microstructural evidence supporting that: the distribution of market maker's states correlates with the magnitude of asset's liquidity risk. In Chapter 3, I theoretically study the social optimal policy function of dealer's meeting technology in over-the-counter markets. This chapter contributes to the existing literature by considering the dealer-level state-dependent meeting technology in a random search model and obtaining explicit-form solutions of the social optimal policy functions. In the model, I allow the agents (dealers) to freely adjust their meeting technologies based on two types of idiosyncratic states: asset position and liquidity need. I find that in the social optimal policy functions, there is no intermediation in the sense that no dealer will choose to search simultaneously on both the buy side and sell side of the market. This result applies for a general form of search-cost function.

Essays on Over-the-counter Markets

2014
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Release : 2014
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Book Synopsis Essays on Over-the-counter Markets by : Zhuo Zhong

Download or read book Essays on Over-the-counter Markets written by Zhuo Zhong. This book was released on 2014. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays studying on over-the-counter trading (OTC henceforth). In Chapter 1, I model the formation of the inter-dealer network in an OTC market, and study how the network affects prices and volumes in the market. The model explains the empirically observed core-periphery network with dealers' capacity of providing liquidity. Specifically, dealers with large capacity comprise the core of the network, connecting them to all other dealers, while dealers who have small capacity operate at the periphery. In addition, my model matches the empirical finding on the negative relation between markups and order sizes. Furthermore, I show that there may be structural breaks in this negative relationship as variations in order sizes may alter the inter-dealer network. These results suggest that empirical studies on OTC markets should control for the stability of an inter-dealer network to avoid model misspecification. Chapter 2 evaluates how a centralized market could provide an incentive for OTC dealers to reduce opacity in trading. In this chapter, opacity is modeled as Knightian uncertainty faced by investors. I find that while a competitive centralized market provides an incentive for dealers to reduce opacity in an OTC market, a noncompetitive centralized market does the opposite. Competition between the competitive centralized market and the OTC market forces dealers in the latter to reduce opacity. With the noncompetitive centralized market, opportunities for collusion provide an incentive for dealers to increase opacity. Dealers do not have the incentive to reduce opacity in this case. In Chapter 3, we test the model implications in Chapter 2 with an empirical study on the corporate bond markets, and find consistent results. We find that transaction costs of bonds traded only in OTC markets are significantly different from (10 basis points larger than) bonds traded both in OTC markets and the NYSE market. Since the latter contains pre-trade information from the NYSE market, this finding suggests that pre-trade transparency reduces bonds' trading costs. This result implies that pre-trade transparency benefits investors but hurts dealers, as the major part of dealers' profits comes from investors' trading costs. We also find that pre-trade transparency increases bonds' values. Bonds with the NYSE pre-trade transparency have significantly lower bond yields than bonds without the pre-trade transparency. Our findings are robust to endogeneity of firms' bond listing decisions on the NYSE.

Essays on frictions in financial over-the-counter markets

2014
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Release : 2014
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Book Synopsis Essays on frictions in financial over-the-counter markets by : Shengxing Zhang

Download or read book Essays on frictions in financial over-the-counter markets written by Shengxing Zhang. This book was released on 2014. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Essays on Financial Market Structure and Design

2012
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Release : 2012
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Book Synopsis Essays on Financial Market Structure and Design by : Mr. Haoxiang Zhu

Download or read book Essays on Financial Market Structure and Design written by Mr. Haoxiang Zhu. This book was released on 2012. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this doctoral dissertation, I study financial market structure and design, namely how institutional features of financial markets affect price discovery, liquidity, search behavior, efficiency, and welfare. This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter studies dark pools and price discovery. Dark pools are equity trading systems that do not publicly display orders. Orders in dark pools are matched within the exchange bid-ask spread without a guarantee of execution. Because informed traders tend to have common information regarding the asset value, they are more likely to cluster on the heavy side of the market and therefore face a lower execution probability in the dark pool, relative to uninformed traders. Consequently, exchanges are more attractive to informed traders, whereas dark pools are more attractive to uninformed traders. Under natural conditions, adding a dark pool alongside an exchange concentrates price-relevant information into the exchange and improves price discovery. The second chapter offers a dynamic model of opaque over-the-counter markets. I build a theoretical model of OTC markets, in which a seller searches for an attractive price by visiting multiple buyers, one at a time. The buyers do not observe contacts, quotes, or trades elsewhere in the market. A repeat contact with a buyer reveals the seller's reduced outside options and worsens the price offered by the revisited buyer. When the asset value is uncertain and common to all buyers, a visit by the seller suggests that other buyers could have quoted unattractive prices and thus worsens the visited buyer's inference regarding the asset value. This chapter is now published at the Review of Financial Studies, Volume 25, Issue 4, April 2012. The third chapter studies settlement auctions for credit default swaps (CDS). This chapter is the joint work with Songzi Du, a fellow Doctoral Candidate at the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University. We find that the one-sided design of CDS auctions used in practice gives CDS buyers and sellers strong incentives to distort the final auction price, in order to maximize payoffs from existing CDS positions. Consequently, these auctions tend to overprice defaulted bonds conditional on an excess supply and underprice defaulted bonds conditional on an excess demand. We propose a double auction to mitigate this price bias. We find the predictions of our model on bidding behavior to be consistent with data on CDS auctions.

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