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Delegation in Contemporary Democracies

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Release : 2006
Genre : Political Science
Kind : eBook
Book Rating : 434/5 ( reviews)

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Book Synopsis Delegation in Contemporary Democracies by : Dietmar Braun

Download or read book Delegation in Contemporary Democracies written by Dietmar Braun. This book was released on 2006. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Written by leading specialists from Europe and the US, this unique text presents a unified view of political delegation, bringing together a wide range of literature to provide a complete and synthetic analysis of delegation in political systems.

Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies

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Release : 2003-11-20
Genre : Political Science
Kind : eBook
Book Rating : 97X/5 ( reviews)

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Book Synopsis Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies by : Kaare Strøm

Download or read book Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies written by Kaare Strøm. This book was released on 2003-11-20. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Parliamentary democracy is the most common way of organizing delegation and accountability in contemporary democracies. Yet knowledge of this type of regime has been incomplete and often unsystematic. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies offers new conceptual clarity on the topic. Taking principal-agent theory as its framework, the work illustrates how a variety of apparently unrelated representation issues can now be understood. This procedure allows scholarship to move well beyond what have previously been cloudy and confusing debates aimed at defining the virtues and perils of parliamentarism. This new empirical investigation includes all seventeen West European parliamentary democracies. These countries are compared in a series of cross-national tables and figures, and seventeen country chapters provide a wealth of information on four discrete stages in the delegation process: delegation from voters to parliamentary representatives, delegation from parliament to the prime minister and cabinet, delegation within the cabinet, and delegation from cabinet ministers to civil servants. Each chapter illustrates how political parties serve as bonding instruments which align incentives and permit citizen control of the policy process. This is complemented by a consideration of external constraints, such as courts, central banks, corporatism, and the European Union, which can impinge on national-level democratic delegation. The concluding chapters go on to consider how well the problems of delegation and accountability are solved in these countries. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies provides an unprecedented guide to contemporary European parliamentary democracies. As democratic governance is transformed at the dawn of the twenty-first century, it illustrates the important challenges faced by the parliamentary democracies of Western Europe.

Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies

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Release : 2006-01-19
Genre : Political Science
Kind : eBook
Book Rating : 608/5 ( reviews)

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Book Synopsis Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies by : Kaare Strøm

Download or read book Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies written by Kaare Strøm. This book was released on 2006-01-19. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Comparative Politics is a series for students and teachers of political science that deals with contemporary issues in comparative government and politics. The General Editors are Max Kaase, Professor of Political Science, Vice President and Dean, School of Humanities and Social Science, International University Bremen, Germany; and Kenneth Newton, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Southampton. The series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research. Today, parliamentarism is the most common form of democratic government. Yet knowledge of this regime type has been incomplete and often unsystematic. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies offers new conceptual clarity on the topic. This book argues that representative democracies can be understood as chains of delegation and accountability between citizens and politicians. Under parliamentary democracy, this chain of delegation is simple but also long and indirect. Principal-agent theory helps us to understand the perils of democratic delegation, which include the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Citizens in democratic states, therefore, need institutional mechanisms by which they can control their representatives. The most important such control mechanisms are on the one hand political parties and on the other external constraints such as courts, central banks, referendums, and supranational institutions such as those of the European Union. Traditionally, parliamentary democracies have relied heavily on political parties and presidential systems more on external constraints. This new empirical investigation includes all seventeen West European parliamentary democracies. These countries are compared in a series of cross-national tables and figures, and seventeen country chapters provide a wealth of information on four discrete stages in the delegation process: delegation from voters to parliamentary representatives, delegation from parliament to the prime minister and cabinet, delegation within the cabinet, and delegation from cabinet ministers to civil servants. Each chapter illustrates how political parties serve as bonding instruments which align incentives and permit citizen control of the policy process. This is complemented by a consideration of external constraints. The concluding chapters go on to consider how well the problems of delegation and accountability are solved in these countries. They show that political systems with cohesive and competitive parties and strong mechanisms of external constraint solve their democratic agency problems better than countries with weaker control mechanisms. But in many countries political parties are now weakening, and parliamentary systems face new democratic challenges. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies provides an unprecedented guide to contemporary European parliamentary democracies. As democratic governance is transformed at the dawn of the twenty-first century, it illustrates the important challenges faced by the parliamentary democracies of Western Europe.

Information, Polarization and Delegation in Democracy

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Author :
Release : 2003
Genre :
Kind : eBook
Book Rating : /5 ( reviews)

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Book Synopsis Information, Polarization and Delegation in Democracy by : Christian Schultz

Download or read book Information, Polarization and Delegation in Democracy written by Christian Schultz. This book was released on 2003. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

The Logic of Delegation

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Release : 1991-06-18
Genre : Business & Economics
Kind : eBook
Book Rating : 299/5 ( reviews)

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Book Synopsis The Logic of Delegation by : D. Roderick Kiewiet

Download or read book The Logic of Delegation written by D. Roderick Kiewiet. This book was released on 1991-06-18. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Why do majority congressional parties seem unable to act as an effective policy-making force? They routinely delegate their power to others—internally to standing committees and subcommittees within each chamber, externally to the president and to the bureaucracy. Conventional wisdom in political science insists that such delegation leads inevitably to abdication—usually by degrees, sometimes precipitously, but always completely. In The Logic of Delegation, however, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins persuasively argue that political scientists have paid far too much attention to what congressional parties can't do. The authors draw on economic and management theory to demonstrate that the effectiveness of delegation is determined not by how much authority is delegated but rather by how well it is delegated. In the context of the appropriations process, the authors show how congressional parties employ committees, subcommittees, and executive agencies to accomplish policy goals. This innovative study will force a complete rethinking of classic issues in American politics: the "autonomy" of congressional committees; the reality of runaway federal bureaucracy; and the supposed dominance of the presidency in legislative-executive relations.

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