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Author : Atsushi Kajii
Release : 1995
Genre :
Kind : eBook
Book Rating : /5 ( reviews)
Book Synopsis The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information by : Atsushi Kajii
Download or read book The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information written by Atsushi Kajii. This book was released on 1995. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Sumantra Sen
Release : 2003
Genre :
Kind : eBook
Book Rating : /5 ( reviews)
Book Synopsis Essays in Uncertainty and Incomplete Information by : Sumantra Sen
Download or read book Essays in Uncertainty and Incomplete Information written by Sumantra Sen. This book was released on 2003. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Robert J. Aumann
Release : 1995
Genre : Business & Economics
Kind : eBook
Book Rating : 471/5 ( reviews)
Book Synopsis Repeated Games with Incomplete Information by : Robert J. Aumann
Download or read book Repeated Games with Incomplete Information written by Robert J. Aumann. This book was released on 1995. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Author : Andrés Perea
Release : 2012-06-07
Genre : Business & Economics
Kind : eBook
Book Rating : 913/5 ( reviews)
Book Synopsis Epistemic Game Theory by : Andrés Perea
Download or read book Epistemic Game Theory written by Andrés Perea. This book was released on 2012-06-07. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.
Author : Dirk Bergemann
Release : 2013
Genre :
Kind : eBook
Book Rating : /5 ( reviews)
Book Synopsis Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information by : Dirk Bergemann
Download or read book Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information written by Dirk Bergemann. This book was released on 2013. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. The set of outcomes that can arise in equilibrium for some information structure is equal to the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with quadratic payoffs and normally distributed uncertainty in terms of restrictions on the first and second moments of the equilibrium action-state distribution. We derive exact bounds on how prior knowledge about the private information refines the set of equilibrium predictions.We consider information sharing among firms under demand uncertainty and find new optimal information policies via the Bayes correlated equilibria. We also reverse the perspective and investigate the identification problem under concerns for robustness to private information. The presence of private information leads to set rather than point identification of the structural parameters of the game.
